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Civil and mifitary applications of space transportation have been pursued for just over 50 
years and there has been, and still is, a need for safe, dependable, affordable, and sustainable 
space transportation systems. Fully expendable and partially reusable space transportation 
systems have been developed and put in operation that have not adequately achieved this 
need. Access to space is technically achievable, but presently very expensive and wifi remain 
so until there is a breakthrough in the way we do business. Since 1991 the national Space 
Propulsion Synergy Team (SPST) has reviewed and assessed the lessons learned from the 
major U.S. space programs of the past decades focusing on what has been learned from the 
assessment and control of Life Cycle Cost (LCC) from these systems. This paper presents the 
results of a selected number of studies and analyses that have been conducted by the SPST 
addressing the need, as well as the solutions, for improvement in LCC. The major emphasis 
of the SPST processes is on developing the space transportation system requirements first 
(up front). These requirements must include both the usual system flight performance 
requirements and also the system functional requirements, including the infrastructure on 
Earth's surface, in-space and on the Moon and Mars surfaces to deteinii ie LCC. This paper 
describes the development of specific innovative engineering and management approaches 
and processes. This includes a focus on ifight hardware maturity for reliability, ground 
operations approaches, and business processes between contractor and government 
organizations. A major change in program/project cost control is being proposed by the 
SPST to achieve a sustainable space transportation system LCC - controffing cost as a 
program metric in addition to the existing practice of controffing performance and weight. 
Without a firm requirement and methodically structured cost control, it is unlikely that an 
affordable and sustainable space transportation system LCC will ever be achieved. 
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I. Introduction 
T
he objective of this paper is to add assurance that the planning and implementation of the transportation systems 
required by a space exploration program take maximum advantage of the "lessons learned" from the major 
space programs of the past decades. The focus of the paper is on what has been learned in the assessment and 
control of Life Cycle Cost (LCC) from these systems. The Nation has always been interested in achieving LCC 
control, but the question was "Ho". The SPST has responded to this challenge and this paper presents a proposed 
option to greatly improve controlling LCC. 
Civil and military applications of Space Transportation have been pursued for 50 years and there has been, and there 
is now, an even greater need for safe, dependable, affordable and sustainable space transportation systems. Fully 
expendable and partially reusable space transportation systems have been developed and put in operation. Access to 
space is technically achievable; but ,resently very expensive and will remain so until there is a breakthrough in the 
way we do business. 
A critical need for improvedcdiriiiiuiiications between the user and thedevëlopérled to NASA's Code R and Code 
M chartering the Space Propütsibñ Synergy Team (SPST) in 1991. The SPST is a national volunteer organization of 
government, industry, and u a reisity expefts in space propulsion, propulsion-related technologies, and other system 
related technologies. The SPST's first task was to use its member's diversified expertise to develop new engineering 
management decision-making '6ols: specifically developing innovative engineering processes in the architectural 
design, development, and opërátiön Of space transportation systems to satisfy the challenging requirements of both 
the transportation system opratórs and the payload customers. The SPST established a dialogue among the 
personnel involved in all phhês' 6f the technology, design, development, and Operation of a space transportation 
system. 
The major theme of the SPST processes is emphases on "developing" the space transportation system 
"requirements" first (up front) that address and respond to the key objectives desired. These requirements must 
include the usual system flight performance and the system functional requirements as well as the total infrastructure 
on Earth's surface, in-space and on the Moon/Mars surface, as appropriate for the application being considered, to 
determine life cycle costs. 
This paper provides a top-level description of the development of these specific innovative engineering and 
management approaches and procèssesThat were developed. The major change the SPST is proposing is to improve 
the control of LCC using major cost influencing Program Metrics rather than just controlling the vehicle flight 
performance andlor mass. 
The basic approach is to adapt the management process for weight control that NASA used on the Space Shuttle 
Program to, in turn, control LCC for space exploration programs. This includes technology, advanced development, 
DDT&E, development, manufacture, operational, and recycle/disposal plus all the infrastructure cost on Earth, in 
space, and on non-terrestrial bodies. This will require a major cultural adjustment to the way the U.S. Government in 
general, and the NASA/aerospace support industry specifically, do business, since LCC - womb to tomb cost - has 
not been included in the traditional program focus (there has never been focus on trying to develop and control an 
economically sustainable space exploration program). Commercial enterprises are required to budget and control the 
LCC of their programs - otherwise they fail and go out of business. 
The SPST proposes to address the global problem of budgeting and controlling LCC by assuring that all 
requirements that address all the major objectives (performance, affordability, safety and sustainability) of the 
intended program are in place from concept defmition through the unique element requirements level. The 
recommended option to achieve these results is the use of structured engineering management processes• to budget 
and control those functions that are the primary LCC drivers of the program. 
H. Background 
Because operations costs, both fixed and those related to flight rate, are one of the largest portions of the LCC of a 
space transportation system, and because they flow from decisions made during the concept defmition and design 
phases, it is useful to examine the current Shuttle Space Transportation System's (STS) costs. 
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The STS is an approximately 4 billion dollar a year operation. This operation is spread throughout the entire 
country. It is composed of: producing external tanks (MSFC and Lockheed-Martin); salvaging, recycling and re-
filling solid rocket boosters and motors (MSFC, KSC and ATK); providing qualified engines for Shuttle Orbiters 
(JSC, SSC, Aerojet, and Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne); providing mission and'flight operations (JSC, Boeing, and 
United Space Alliance); providing ground operations (KSC and United Space Alliance); and providing for a host of 
assorted other functions from NASA Headquarters to Dryden Flight Research Center and includes coordination with 
the Air Force for use of the Eastern Test Range. The program represents a complex interaction of many entities. All 
these functions include work from the most direct (a technician, a flight controller, a line manufacturing employee, 
etc.) to the most indirect (a manager, a logistics provider, a scheduler, a procurement, fmance or human resources 
officer, etc.). 
The ground operations at Kennedy Space Center (KSC), as one of the most visible costs, serves as a representative 
example to examine in more detail. 
Shuttle ground operations at KSC is a roughly 1.4 billion dollar a year operation. It can be divided into eight 
categories: contractors (Categories 1 - 5); technicians hands-on labor (Category 1); Engineering, Safety & Quality 
(Category 2); Program Management and Internal Business Functions (Category 3); logistics, depot maintenance and 
interface to original equipment manufacturers (Category 4); sub-contractors to the primes (Category 5); NASA 
Program, Project and Institution (Categories 6 - 8); NASA Program and Project Management (Category 6); NASA 
and contractors center management and operations (Category 7); and, KSC infrastructure (Category 8). 
The work ranges from Category 1, which is close-in, hands-on the flight hardware and support equipment at KSC, 
until, at Category 8, the work is on the base infrastructure, enabling, but farther removed from day-to day flight 
hardware processing. The indirect business category, often called overhead, lies for the contractor in Category 3, 
while for the government it lies in Category 7. The engineers and more technical support in Category 2 and 6 work 
together on a day-to-day basis. The largest workforce under one organization lies in Category 3, as this is the class 
of work which enables all else.. Category 3 includes program management, requirements management, 
documentation control, configuration ontro1, scheduling, work control inc1udjn work document generation, 
interfaces to outside organizations su,ch as.other centers, suppliers, and the government as customer. Category 3 also 
includes internal facing business functions more readily defined as business costs., 
	
.-':	 -	 V	 .... 
The eight KSC detail Catçgpriçs.rçakout , a follows: Category 1 is $OMJyear;..Category 2 is $150M/year; Category 
3 is $200M/year; Category .4 i $l75M/year (all Orbiter); Category .5 is$ii5Mlyear; Category 6 is $7SMIyear; 
Category 7 is $300MIyear, and Category 8 is$200MJyear as shown in Figure 1 
Plus, there are additional costs of approximately $1 5OMIyear for oher Reuseable" Solid Rocket Motor I Reusable 
Solid Rocket Booster (RSRMJRSRB) operations located at KSC but managed by the Marshall Space Flight Center 
(MSFC). This is over $1.4 billion dollars a yer in fimds with an approximate local Floiida impact of 12,000 people 
to prepare, support or otherwise, enable the Space Shuttle launches. 
It is tempting to assume that ar,eductionintechnician's hands-on labor, byhavi1ig simpler hardware or a smaller, 
less complex system, will cascade through all the other support function. In 'piatide some costs are fixed and 
relationships are more complex.Fexamp1e, streamlining a process and el 	 atin half the hands-on work on a 
task does not necessarily eliminate half..th programmatic and adrninistrativesuppor. 	 . 
The exploration program can immediately recogmze that large sums go towards potentially architecture independent 
areas of program management (such as contractor Category 3 costs), as well as center functions that have nothing to 
do with an architecture (such as NASA and contractor Category 4 costs). The contractor business functions that 
include requirements generation, planning, document preparation, configuration ontrol, scheduling, etc. are by 
nature connected to technical matunty as measured by demonstrated reliability A part or sub system that fails 
during any phase before launch isa reason for extensive support and/or business fundtions (Category 2 through 5) to 
exist, as well as driving as much as 25 to5O percent of Category 1 dollars. 	 , 
3 
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Figure 1. Shuttle Ground Operations Cost at KSC ($Millions/year) 
An unreliable system can never be affordable for human space flight because if the system is unreliable, then the 
support and business functions will be designed, or persist due to lack of investment, in forms that attempt to 
"process" in what was not designed into the system (such as by higher volumes of production, andlor higher 
numbers of test-fail-fix cycles in early design development). 
Nonetheless, the indirect support activities, especially Categories 2, 3, 6, and 7, so dependent on information flow 
judging by their descriptive functions, represent immediate opportunities for affordability gains. Saving even 20% of 
categories 2, 3, 6, and 7 at KSC alone would save $l5OMIyear. The extrapolation to the entire $4B would be on the 
order of SSOOMIyear savings. Such an initiative is encouraged starting with an emphasis on business process, such 
as in engineering, and proceeding to program management, and eventually leading to the implementation of select 
additional investments in re-engineered processes such as via modem information technology. 
Maturity, as manifest in demonstrated reliability, would be an item for generational advance and investment. Initial 
investments here would include an initiative to quantify where design technology maturity would best ripple through 
the entire system composed of all Categories, but at the NASA and program level. 
III. Problem Statement 
This Nation's ability to provide the development and operation, of safe, dependable, affordable and sustainable 
space transportation systems is still not being achieved. 
During conceptual definition and DDT&E phases, the only major objective (system attribute) controlled in past and 
present programs by a structured Engineering Management process is performance closure by managing flight 
systems weight. The present cost estimating process bases cost on flight system dry weight and performs all trade 
studies optimizing each single flight system function, with no effort to address integrating the total systems 
4
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
092407
44th AIAA/ASMEJSAEJASEE Joint Propulsion Conference	 A1AA 2008-52 14 
20-23 July 2008, Hartford, Connecticut 	 6 May 2008 
considering all desired attributes As an example, objectives were set for LCC for the Shuttle, but no Engineering 
Management processes were exercised to provide control (only the DDT&E cost was tracked). Because the 
objective was not treated as a requirement, it was not achieved. 	 S	 FL 
The Saturn/Apollo lunar exploration program was terminated early because the recurring transportation cost was not 
sustainable while supporting the exploration efforts. The reusable Shuttle transportation system was developed to 
replace the Saturn launch vehicle in an effort to greatly reduce the recurring costoftransportation. Even though the 
recurring cost of space transportation systems operation was reduced approximately'50 to 60 percent, the reduction 
was not sufficient and did not approach the target goal. 
The major lesson identified from the Saturn/Apollo and Shuttle experience isthat much improved, innovative 
processes must be developed and rigorously applied to effectively control LCCcAtiy future space transportation 
system LCC must be controlled throughout the entire design concept phase, DDT&E'phase, and its operations phase 
to provide a sustainable space exploration program. Since a major part of LCC for'a space transportation system is 
the recurring or operational phase cost, this cost must be defmed in the' design/'concept phase and rigorously 
controlled throughout that and subsequent phases. 
IV. Historical Shortfalls and Lessons Learned 
Historical shortfalls, historical successes and lessons learned all provide an important roadmap to understanding and 
building an approach to achieving desired program LCC. 
Historical programs have been successful in meeting their explicit objectives and their explicit requirements. For 
example, Saturn/Apollo reached the moon and did so safely within the required schedule, Skylab was completed 
within its schedule using existing resources, the Shuttle program produced a reusable space transportation system, 
and quite a number of space probes and landers have been successful in exploring the solar system. Although all 
these programs have been successful in meeting their major objectives, they haye not been successful in meeting all 
their goals. The common thread in achieving the successes has been the use of structured management and 
engineering processes to control explicit objectives. The common thread in the lack of success for some of the goals 
has been the lack of application of these processes to these goals. Objectives that had the processes applied were 
treated as "requirements" and were achieved, and those that did not, were treated as "goals" and always lost out in 
trades against "requirements". "Requirements" are "musts" and "goals" are only "wants". And "wants" always lose 
out to "musts". 
The following sections of this -paper summarize four studies performed by the SPST that address these LCC issues: 
(1) Current STS Shortfalls Study, (2) Bottoms-Up Study, (3) Generic Functional System Breakdown Structure Study 
and (4) Balancing System Safety, Reliability and Maintainability Requirements Study. 
V. Current STS Shortfalls Study 
To control space transportation system it is necessary to identify the major cost dri'ers. Design decisions drive the 
operations costs which then dominate the LCC. The SPST conducted a study that identified the major operations 
cost drivers. (1) 
The study reformatted the major lessons learned from previous programs as Technical Performance Metrics (TPMs). 
To the degree that these are implemented, both the design and the operations aspects of LCC will decrease. 
Performance and weight can be adversely impacted by the pursuit of these TPM's in some missions and some 
architectures. Consequently, a balance must be struck between these TPMs and the performance and weight to 
achieve an acceptable LCC. This balancing should guide the architecture development. 
Of the sixty-four TPMs identified in the study, the following eighteen have been determined to be the major cost 
drivers. The design and operations aspects of LCC are decreased by establishing minimum values of these TPMs 
consistent with the mission objectives and then flowing down the values of the TPMs as actual requirements. The 
SPST sought a method to compare many different variables and understand their interrelationship with each other. 
The tool chosen was a specific Total Quality Management (TQM) tool - Quality Functional Deployment (QFD). 
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These results were supplemented by the Shuttle Shortfall Analysis study. The procedure is to minimize each of these 
factors. The factors to be minimized (in order of importance) are: 
1. Total number of separate identified vehicle propulsion systems and/or separate stages; 
2. Total number of flight tai:iks in the architecture; 
3. Number of safety driven functional requirements to maintain safe control of systems during flight and ground 
operations; 
4. Number of maintenance actions unplanned before or between missions; 
5. Number of maintenance actionsplanned before or between missions; 
6. Total number of traditional ground interface functions required; 
7. Percent of all systems not automated; 
8. Number of different fluids required; 
9. Total number of vehicle element-to-element support systems; 
10. Number of flight vehicle servicing interfaces; 
11. Number of confmed/closed compartments; 
12. Number of commodities used thatrequire medical support operations and routine training; 
13. Number of safety driven limited access control operations; 
14. Number of safmg operations at landing (for reusable elements); 
15. Number of mechanical element mating operations; 
16. Number of separate electrióal- supply interfaces; 
17. Number of intrusive data gathering devices; 
18. Number of Criticality 1 sstein and failure analysis modes. 
After defining an architectuie tising-these TPMs, a structured engineering management process would then be 
needed to budget and control the TPMs throughout the design and development phases of any future program. 
VI. Bottoms-Up Study 
Another study performed by the SPST was a "bottoms-up" analysis which addressed the question of why past 
programs weren't achieving the desired functional criteria: "what has impeded or prevented the application of good 
systems engineering and management's successful implementation of the approaches/processes addressed to achieve 
an affordable LCC."	 ---'	 - 
Candidate technology areas were defmed to identif r potential technology solutions to fundamental technical and 
operational barriers or impediments to the development of advanced RLV systems that would be capable of meeting 
program cost, safety, and responsiveness goals. Workshop prioritization results and the technology areas 
recommended for investment consideration were documented that apply to advanced propulsion technologies for 
potential future applications to in-space robotic missions, including high thrust and low thrust earth orbital, lunar 
and planetary missions. 
The candidate technology areas identified by the bottoms-up assessment process, the criteria used for pnoritization 
of these areas, the workshop participants, and the workshop process and procedures were summarized and 
conclusions drawn based on the results. (2) 
The SPST's approach emphasized traceability to second generation systems and technologies. Structured 
brainstorming was used to identif' technologies and conceptual solutions that directly address advanced reusable 
launch vehicle (RLV) system design criteria such as those developed over the past several years by the SPST. The 
current Space Shuttle systems and operations practice was used as the pivot or reference technology base against 
which all the candidate technologies would be assessed for prioritization in the workshop. A white paper briefmg 
was prepared for the reference Shuttle technology base. The results were summarized in 26 candidate technologies 
organized into six selected categories as descried below. 
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Vehicle Health Monitoring (VIIM) Technologies 
1. Critical Failures Identification - 100% IVHM data to identify all credible critical failures in adequate 
time to implement corrective action or abort. 
2. Systems Health Verification - Provide totally integrated and automated functional health verification for 
all systems. 
3. Automated Predictive Maintenance - Automated predictive maintenance capability designed in as part of 
component development. 
4. Preflight Checkout - IVHM performs all preflight checks; visible check only required. 
Margin Technologies 
5. Air-breathing Main Propulsion - Develop all air-breathing concept (including ejector rocket, subsonic 
LACE, combined cycle) system alternatives that have benefit measured in payload to dry weight ratio and 
with an acceptable level of complexity. Develop as an integrated solution using comparable (to rocket) 
techniques. 
6. Lightweight Subsystems - Develop lighter weight propulsion subsystems. 
7. High Performance Subsystems - Develop higher performance propulsion' subsystems (higher I, lower 
temperature, lower pump pressure, longer life subsystems). 
Operations Technologies 
8. Elimination of Support Systems - The development of critical technologies eliminating the need for 
ground support systems; e.g self-contained engine valve and TVC actuators, eliminating requirement for 
distributed pneumatic and hydraulic systems. 
9. Elimination of Turnaround Operations - Develop technologies that eliminate operations associated with 
turnaround of propulsiowsystern(no purging or cleaning operations).. 
10 Leak Free Joints - Develop leak free joints in propulsion systems (including H2). 
11. Simplified Mating Operations. Develop simplified mating. operations technologies (automated 
alignments, fluid connections, and interface checks). 
12. Passive Aero Solutions - Develop technologies to utilize pasive . açrpdyi3amics to minimize venting 
and purging requirements and eliminate the use of closed compartmenii 
13. Single Main Propel1ais - Use same main propellants in multiple stage vehicles. 
14. Wireless Conimumca'tion - Develop and mature wireless coñmn'uniôation technology required to 
eliminate element-to-element and element-to-ground umbilicals., 
•	 1	 ' '''.'.'" eh pc'	 mi'' 
15. Cleaning Alternatives - Develop environmentally acceptable materials and cleaning alternatives that do 
not substantially compromise performance. 
16. Cryogenic Conditioning - Minimize the need for cryogenic conditioning to start vehicle engines. 
Safety Technologies 
17. System Failures Tolerance - Develop the ability to tolerate creliblesystm failures (e.g., contain an 
engine blade failure).	 .,, 
18 Pyrotechmcs Elimination - Eliminate all pyrotechnic devices in favor of highly reliable reusable 
mechanical devices.
Thermal Control Technologies 
19. Active TPS Elimination - Develop use of ultra high temperature ceramics to eliminate active TPS and 
explore a wider range of FPS technologies in an operational environmeni mcluding transpiration cooling, 
ablatives, heat sinks, passive aero.techniques (search for fundamental thermcdynamic technologies). 
20. Active Thermal Control , Elimination - Develop generic technologies tbat eliminate active thermal 
management systems.
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Technologies to Reduce Number of Systems 
21. All Rocket Cycle - Use of all rocket cycle propulsion technologies. 
22. Integrated Propulsion/Thermal/Power - Use of technologies to integrate Reaction Control System 
(RCS), Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS), Main Propulsion System (MPS), Thermal Management, and 
Power Generation into one system. 
23. Integrated RCS/OMS/MPS -'Use of tecimologies to integrate RCS, OMS, and MPS into one system. 
24. Integrated RCS/OMS - Use of technologies to integrate RCS and OMS into one system. 
25. Residual Gases Utilization - Component development to allow use of unusable residual gases for 
propulsion functions. 
26. MPS Low Thrust Mode for OMS - Use of a very low thrust MPS mode for the OMS propulsion 
function.
Prioritization Criteria 
Over the past several years the SPST has developed and weighted a set of technical and programmatic criteria for 
use in assessing and prioritizing candidate propulsion and propulsion-related technologies for the development of 
advanced RLV systems. The criteria were weighted using a structured Quality Function Deployment (QFD) process 
supported by NASA input. 
The SPST workshop evaluation team assessed and scored each candidate technology area against each of the 
technical and programmatic criteria. For each candidate technology area, the evaluators considered the question: 
"What is the potential of this technology area compared to current Shuttle technology or practice to contribute to 
achieving the given criterion for advanced RLV systems?" 
Global Priorities for Decreasing Costs 
A separate assessment at the workshop of the candidate technology areas for their potential specifically to reduce the 
cost of advanced RLV systems indicated that the Automated Predictive Maintenance, the Elimination of Turnaround 
Operations, and Systems Health Verification are high priority technology areas. These are followed in priority by a 
number of other IVHM, Operations, and technologies that reduce the number of systems to be developed and 
operated.
Combining all Global Data 
The results of combining the separate global technical, programmatic, safety, and cost results with equal weightings 
(25% each) indicated that the IVHM technologies had high priorities. The data also indicated that the technical and 
programmatic influences placed strong priority on reducing the number of systems, improving operations, and 
increasing system margins.	 '
Summary Overall Bottoms-up Study 
The following conclusions were drawn from the global prioritization results of the workshop: 
1. The results of the global processing of the data across all 25 technical and 19 programmatic criteria indicate that 
the highest leverage propulsion and propulsion related technologies are those that: 
(1) Reduce the number of systems to be designed, developed, tested, and operated; 
(2) Increase system margins; and 
(3) Simplify thermal control of the flight vehicle. 
IVHM and Operations technologies are important but are prioritized lower based on the given technical and 
programmatic criteria. 
2. The results of the team's two additional assessments of the 26 candidate technology areas for their potential to 
specifically increase safety and decrease costs showed that the IVHM technologies (particularly Automated 
Predictive Maintenance and Systems Health Verification) are of high priority. 
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These data also showed that several; Operations technology areas are important to reduce costs, including 
particularly the Elimination of Turnaround Operations, Elimination of Support Systems, Simplified Mating 
Operations, and the Use of Single Main Propellants. 
In addition, the reduction -of the number of systems will be important particularly the use of Integrated 
PropulsionlThermaLIPower systems and Integrated RCS!OMSIMPS designs. 
3. Combining the results of the baseline technical and programmatic priorities ith the separate safety and cost 
assessments shows that overall the IVHM technologies are highest priority for investment. 
4. Most of the technology solution areas identified by the SPST that address the impediments or barriers to 
achieving advanced RLV system goals tend to not be very exotic or exciting technologies. However, they address 
areas where large technological improvements are required. Also these technology areas tend to be crosscutting and 
are required by most envisioned system-concepts. It is believed that detailed studies would show strong benefit-to-
investment cost ratios for most of the identified high priority I high leverage technology areas. 
Overall results are very stimulating and deserving of more in-depth attention. For example, it was found that there 
are several reasons for the impediments: lack of overall integration (stove-piping or optimizing at the single function 
level), inappropriate starting technology level, the lack of sufficient Engineering Management processes, and that 
many of the systems engineering requirements (needs), were "boring", not stimulating (not sexy). This indicates that 
major improvements in discipline must be rigorously imposed on the system engineering and design processes by 
the program managers and the chief systems engineers. 
VII. Generic Functional System Breakdown Structure Study 
The LCC of the entire exploration architecture consists of the development and acquisition costs and the operations 
and disposal costs. For space transportation systems that will be in place for a iong time, typical for U. S. space 
systems, the operations and disposal costs will dominate the LCC. New programs-must be "sustainable", e.g., they 
must be within their specific budget and within their yearly budget caps both during procurement and throughout 
their long operating life. For this to be achievable, operability must be designed into the architectures and elements 
from the very beginning. Failure to achieve the budgeted transportation-costs will squeeze the exploration budget 
and has the potential to severely impact the sustainability of the entire program.-
The operations and disposal costs are determined, often without specific planning, during the system architecture 
definition and the individual element developments. It has been estimated that 80 percent of the design decisions are 
irreversibly made in the system architecture definition and the individual element development design phases. 
It is very difficult during architecture definition to balance and minimize, or:even compare, the overall LCC, 
including both development and acquisition costs and operations costs. This is primarily due to the lack of full 
definition of all the necessary functions of the potential architecture options. Different options have different levels 
of definition but still must be compared. And often not all of the supporting elements necessary for each architecture 
are identified at all. It is also very difficult during element developments, primarily due to schedule and budget 
pressures, to maintain the design discipline to- ensure that operations costs will.not escalate due to design decisions 
addressing immediate design, weight, performance, or development problems.- The emphasis in design is to get the 
job done (i.e., achieve weight -and performance) within the schedule and- hopefully within the budget. When 
problems must be solved there is seldom the budget or schedule available to -properly consider the operations cost 
impacts of the design options examined. Consequently, the future operations and disposal costs escalate to improve 
the currently incurred development costs. 
Only if overall LCC, including operations, is a required metric, co-equal with weight and performance, can the LCC 
have any real chance of being controlled. In the past, goals for LCC were not a contractual requirement that was 
flowed down to the individual element developments with rewards and penalties equal to those for weight and 
performance. Consequently, LCC goals simply have not been met. 
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The SPST has studied this problem since 1991 and has developed approaches and tools to address the problem. The 
Shuttle Shortfall Analysis studs', the "bottoms-up" study, and the QFD determination of the cost drivers have clearly 
shown that the most important means to control LCC is to fully and clearly define the requirements of the program. 
The requirements must addr'ess both the flight objectives (as is commonly done) and the functional objectives 
including the entire supportinfrastructure. These requirements must be' allocated and flowed down throughout the 
entire architecture. Requirements not flOwed down, become "goals" and may not be met. 
It is necessary to identify all the requirements and elements of an architecture at the beginning of a program if the 
LCC is to be controlled. The SPST has developed a methodology utilizing a Functional Breakdown Structure (FBS) 
to accomplish this difficult task. 
The FBS is a structured, modular'breakdown of every function that must be addressed to perform a generic mission 
and is also usable for any subset of the mission. It is not tied to any particular architectural implementation because 
it is a listing of the needed functions (not elements of the architecture).. The FBS provides a universal hierarchy of 
required functions, which include ground and space operations as well as infrastructure - it provides total visibility 
of the entire mission. This is a new approach that will provide full accountability of all functions required to perform 
the planned mission. It serves as a giant check list to be sure that no functions are omitted, especially in the early 
architectural design phase. 	 - -- ..	 ....... 
A significant characteristic of aFBS is that if architecture options are compared using this approach, then any 
missing or redundant elements of each option will be identified. Consequently valid LCC comparisons can be made. 
For example, one architecture option might not need a particular function while another option does. One option 
may have individual elements to perform each of three functions while another- option needs only one element to 
perform the three functions. --' --	 . 
Once an architecture has been selected, the FBS will serve as a guide in development of the work breakdown 
structure (WBS), provide visibility of those technologies that need to be further developed to perform required 
functions, and help identify the personnel skills required to develop and operate the architecture. It also will allow 
the systems engineering activities to totally integrate each discipline to the maximum extent possible and optimize at 
the total system level, thus avoiding optimizing at the element level (stove-piping). In addition, it furnishes a 
framework which will help prevent over or under specifying requirements because all functions are identified and all 
elements are aligned to functions.. 
The SPST has developed a preliminary space transportation system FBS including supporting elements for a 
manned exploration mission. 
VIII. Balancing System Safety, Reliabffity, and Maintainabifity Requirements Study 
One design technique for increasing mission reliability emphasizes increased redundancy. However, it should be 
noted that this technique, i.e., increasing reliability through redundancy, often results in increasing the 
maintainability burden. 
A notional example that demonstrates how added redundancy, inserted in a design to increase reliability, may also 
increase the maintainability burden is shown in Figure 2. The example sited compares a notional triple redundant 
string (Case 1 left) with a dual redundant sthng (Case 2 right). The examples use a mission reliability goal of 0.99 9. 
Case 1 results in a 300:1 added burden on maintainability, whereas case 2 results in a 60:1 added burden. The 
resulting outcome on recurring cost is different - the added parts count of Case 1 increases cost compared to Case 2. 
A thorough appreciation of the coupling of maintainability and reliability must be held throughout the design phase, 
and design teams must strive for low parts counts in order to meet critical maintainability objectives. 
10
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
092407
44th AIAAIASME'SAE'ASEE Joint Propulsion Conference 	 AJAA 2008-5214 
20-23 July 2008, Hartford, Connecticut 	 6 May 2008 
The Coupling of Maintainability 
And Reliability (Redundancy - Case) 
Techniques for increasing mission reliability (increased redundancy) should be used only to 
achieve safety goals desired above and beyond that reliability required to produce the lowest life 
cycle cost avoiding added maintainability burden. 
Simple Exam ple Comparisons 
(Each with common reliability/safety requirements, but very different maintainability 
burdens and recurring cost outcomes) 
Case 1: Reliability objective set = 0.999 with single stnng component Iwo orders-of-magnitude more reliable than 
using three parallel components 
• 1:1000 = 3 of 1:10 in parallel = 0.999 reliability objective (Reliability = 1 -1/10 = 0.999) 
• Result: 300:1 added burden on maintainability for triple redundancy vs. single higher reliability 
component 
Q2: Seeks to find a dual redundant solution and meet the Reliability objective set = 0.999 
• 1:1000 = 2 of 1:32 in parallel = 0.999 reliability objective (Reliability = 1 1/322 = 0.999) 
• Result: 60:1 added burden on maintainability for dual redundancy vs. single higher reliability component 
Figure 2. Coupling of Maintainability and Reliability: Sample Case Study 
Individual design teams often seek to optimize their system, and system engineering staffs often force this onto them 
via the requirements definition process. Design teams must first and foremost meet their specifications (be 
compliant). Program management must look at the total vehicle, its operations, its future upgrade paths as a whole 
system, and be disciplined enough to appreciate the necessity of coupling maintainability and reliability goals with 
performance goals to prevent independent subsystem level optimizations from collectively adversely affecting LCC. 
As an example, even though the Shuttle initial design considerations emphasized performance, maintainability goals 
were also set, but inadequate internal discipline was exercised and a high performance, but also high maintenance 
cost, flight system was the result. Recurring costs and maintenance costs must be reduced and an essential factor in 
that process is the introduction of fewer, but more highly reliable, components. The inevitable "growth in parts 
count" that results from "highly redundant" design approaches often leads to maintenance intensive designs. 
If the element or component reliability requirements to achieve the desired minimum maintainability burden become 
prohibitive, then the efforts must focus on other methods of reducing the parts count. The reduction in parts count 
may be accomplished through improved functional integration of systems, restructuring redundant combinations to a 
minimum, and using the highest element reliability possible. 
The "maintainability burden" is a major driver of recurring cost. Often a key element in the recurring cost burden is 
a direct function of the number of parts. Part counts increase when the reliability of the selected parts is not 
sufficient to meet safety needs and redundancy is instituted to achieve reliability goals. Part counts are also 
increased by the lack of functional systems integration. To achieve recurring cost objectives, highly reliable parts 
must be used in the design, which in turn leads to lower repair requirements that will drive down the maintainability 
requirement. Figures 3 and 4 show these effects.
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Figure 3. Flight System Cost Dependence on Reliability, Maintainability 
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Figure 4. Mission Reliability, Repairs over Flight Rate Period and MTBF 
Thus it is imperative to conduct early technology development programs to achieve the availability of high 
reliability parts. 
Achieving this balance of design life requirements with safety and maintainability objectives requires a process such 
as that shown in Figure 5 for developing and balancing quantitative safety, reliability and maintainability 
requirements. Achieving the appropriate balance among these factors to achieve low recurring cost requires a 
thorough understanding of subsystem element reliability, subsystem element fail rate and the number of serial 
system elements.
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Figure 5. Process for Developing and Balancing Quantitative Safety, Reliability and Maintenance 
Requirements. 
IX. Conclusions and Recommendations 
To take maximum advantage of the "lessons learned" from the major space programs of the past decades, this paper 
has reviewed top-level results of a selected number of studies and analyses that have been conducted by the SPST. 
These directly address the "lessons learned" from previous transportation systems. 
These extensive studies by the SPST have shown the need of LCC control, but introduction has been a continuing 
problem as new programs have been implemented without such effective control. The SPST is recommending that 
the aerospace industry adopt the proven methods of controlling weight and performance and apply them to 
controlling cost. 
Insight gained from performing the shortfalls assessment stresses the need to perform optimization at the total 
systems level and not at the subsystem level (stove-piping). The SPST has also developed a new approach for 
formulating "requirements" that will provide full accountability of all functions required to perform the planned 
missions. The approach is to develop a top-level functional systems breakdown structure, FBS, with modular subsets 
that may be utilized as a basis for defming the desired "functional requirements" in any system. This process will 
then serve as a guide in development of the work breakdown structure (WBS), provide visibility of those 
technologies that need to be developed, and help identify the personnel skills required to develop and operate the 
space transportation system. 
The functional breakdown structure (FBS) should be used to ensure that architecture options are compared fully and 
validly. Once the architecture is chosen that can meet the performance and LCC requirements, then the LCC and 
performance requirements must be allocated and flowed down to all lower tiers. The FBS should be used for this. 
LCC, or an LCC allocation, must be a requirement at each of the lower tiers. 
Once the performance and LCC requirements have been flowed down, an addition to the engineering management 
processes must be made to add a new structured engineering management process modeled on the processes used in 
the past to successfully manage, track, and control weight. This process must be enforced by the program managers 
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throughout the design, development, production and operation of the program. The process should include 
contractual rewards and penalties for LCC compliance where contracting methods are exercised just as they are used 
for performance and weight. The objective is to establish LCC as a true requirement and to not let it become merely 
a "goal". 
In summary the SPST recommendations are: 
1. Make LCC, including operations and disposal, a required metric, co-equal with weight and performance, and 
flow it down to the individual element developments with rewards and penalties in the same manner as used 
for weight and performance control. 
2. Define architectures using the TPMs described earlier in this paper and implement a structured engineering 
management process to budget and control the TPMs throughout the design and development phases of the 
program. 
3. Fully and clearly define the requirements at the program beginning. 
a. Use a functional breakdown structure (FBS) as a tool to accomplish this full definition. 
4. Use requirements and engineering management control processes to control major operational technical 
functions that greatly influence LCC. 
5. Balance the safety, reliability, and maintainability requirements to provide controls on recurring maintenance 
burden to provide operational effectiveness and LCC control: 
a. develop a thorough understanding of the cost dependence on reliability and maintainability tradeoffs; 
b. develop a thorough appreciation of the coupling of maintainability and reliability; 
c. use a methodology or process for developing and balancing quantitative safety, reliability and 
maintainability requirements.
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